

## სტივენ ჯონსი

### საქართველოს “ვარდების რევოლუცია”: პალაოგრივი მშვიდობა

ქართველი მშობლები უყურებენ თბილისის ცივ და წვიმიან ქუჩებში გამართულ თეატრს - “ვარდების რევოლუციის” გამირობასა და დიდებას და შიშისაგან ცახცახებენ. გაზეთები აცხადებენ, რომ ჩრდილოეთიდან წამოსული ჯარისკაცებით სავსე ტრანსპორტი დაბლოკა სოფლების მოსახლეობის მიერ გზებზე აღმართულმა ბარიკადებმა. სახელმწიფო კანცელარიამ გააფრთხილა მოსახლეობა მეორე სამოქალაქო ომის შესახებ. ქართველმა მშობლებმა გაიხსენეს 1956, 1989, 1991 წწ. მსგავსი გამოწვევები, რომელთა კულმინაცია დახოცილი მოზარდები იყო. დასავლელი ლიდერებიც გამოთქვამდნენ უკმაყოფილებას. 2003 წლის ადრეულ პერიოდში სენატორი ჯონ მაკკეინი, ჯონ შალიკაშვილი და სტროუბ ტალბოტი ჩავიდნენ საქართველოში. ივლისში ჯეიმს ბეიკერი ჩაფრინდა თბილისში სამართლიანი არჩევნების დასაკვირვებლად. ასეთი ყურადღება განპირობებული იყო იმით, რომ საქართველოს მნიშვნელოვანი როლი ეკისრებოდა “ცივ მშვიდობაში”, რუსეთთან უთანხმოებას მილსადენებთან დაკავშირებით კი, შესაძლოა, მოულოდნელი შედეგები მოჰყოლოდა აშშ-ს გეგმებისთვის, რომლებიც საქართველოს ტერიტორიაზე იმყოფებოდნენ. არსებობდა იმედი წარმატებული პროდასავლური ტრანზიტისა რეგიონში და განმტკიცდებოდა არგუმენტი იმის შესახებ, რომ აშშ გულუხვია, როცა საქმე დემოკრატიულ ექსპერიმენტს ეხება. საბედნიეროდ, კრიზისი საქართველოში არაძალადობრივი აღმოჩნდა.

ბევრმა დასავლელმა დამკვირვებელმა “ვარდების რევოლუცია” განიხილა როგორც ამერიკული და ევროპული პოლიტიკის გამართლება სამოქალაქო და დემოკრატიულ განვითარებაში. რიჩარდ მაილსმა, რომელიც იმ დროისთვის აშშ-ს ელჩი იყო, მშვიდად ამოისუნთქა, რადგან, ბოლოს და ბოლოს, საქართველოსგან “რალაც გამოვიდა”. ტრიუმფალური რიტორიკისა (რომელიც თბილისის თავისუფლების მოედანზე ისმოდა) და დასავლური კაპიტალის რაციონალიზაციის მიუხედავად, ამ რევოლუციის ბედი, როგორც სხვა დანარჩენებისა, ბევრზე ეკიდა — რევოლუცია მოულოდნელი და არასასურველი იყო თავად ოპოზიციის ლიდერთათვისაც.

“ვარდების რევოლუცია”, ისევე როგორც რევოლუციები სერბეთში (2000), უკრაინასა (2004-2005) და ყირგიზეთში (2005), განიხილებოდა როგორც არაძალადობრივი ნაბიჯი კორუფციული და ხშირად რეპრესიული მთავრობების წინააღმდეგ. მან აჩვენა, რომ რევოლუციის დასასრულის ჩანაფიქრი კომუნისმის დამარცხებისა და “ლიბერალური დემოკრატიის” შემდეგ იყო უდროო, წინასწარ მოუფიქრებელი. ის ამტკიცებდა არაძალადობრივი სტრატეგიის ეფექტურობას.

მიუხედავად იმისა, რომ იზიარებდა 1989 წლის რევოლუციის ღირებულებებს, ვარდების რევოლუციამ არ დააყენა გადამწყვეტი მოთხოვნები ეკონომიკური, სოციალური და სისტემური ცვლილებების შესახებ. მან პოსტკომუნისტური რევოლუციის ახალი მოდელი გამოამჟღავნა. ვარდების რევოლუციის ლიდერთა სლოგანი იყო "რევოლუცია რევოლუციის გარეშე". მას არ გააჩნდა არავითარი იდეოლოგიური ინოვაცია, არავითარი "ანტიპოლიტიკა", ან "სიმართლით ცხოვრება", არ არსებობდა სოციალური ან მშვიდობიანი ხასიათის მოძრაობა და მოლოდინი სოციალ-ეკონომიკური ტრანსფორმაციისა. არაძალადობრიობა იყო სტრატეგია და არა იდეოლოგიური მიზანი. იდეური გაგებით, დასავლეთეევროპული წინამორბედებისაგან განსხვავებით, რევოლუცია გაცილებით სუსტი იყო.

პროტესტის მასშტაბები, ცვლილებათა სისწრაფე, მმართველი ელიტის არაინტეგრაციულობა, შეიარაღებული ძალების მიერ პრეზიდენტ შევარდნაძის მიტოვება, ემოციური გამოსვლები სახელმწიფო კანცელარიის წინ, მოწოდებები განახლებისა და ეროვნული ერთობისაკენ — ეს იყო რევოლუციური სიტუაციის მახასიათებლები. "ვარდების რევოლუცია" კლასიკური მაგალითია ცენტრიდან მომდინარე სტრუქტურული არაინტეგრაციულობისა. ამ პროცესს სერ ლუის ნაშიერმა "მთავრობის მორალური და მენტალური ბაზების კოროზია" უწოდა.

სამთავრობო მმართველობაში თაობათა მზრივ გარკვეული ცვლილებების, კორუფციული არჩევნებისა და ოლიგარქების "ემანსიპაციის" მიუხედავად, გაჩნდა პრეტენზიები "ვარდების რევოლუციის" გლობალური მნიშვნელობის მიმართ, რადგან მისი მიზანი იყო "ანტირევოლუციური რევოლუცია".

"ვარდების რევოლუციის" რეპუტაცია ემყარება მის ხარისხს. ეს იყო პირველი წარმატებული შეტევა პოსტსაბჭოთა სივრცეში, როგორც იტყვიან, "კონკურენტუნარიან ავტორიტარულ სახელმწიფოში". ყველა ამ სახელმწიფოს — საქართველოს, სომხეთს, უკრაინასა და ყირგიზეთს — მართავდნენ საბჭოურად გაწვრთნილი ჩინოვნიკები. მათ საჯაროდ დაგმეს დემოკრატიულობა, არჩევნების, პრესის თავისუფლების ხარისხისა და ორგანიზებული საჯარო თანხმობის ჩათვლით, მაგრამ ეს ყველაფერი წინ უძღოდა რეჟიმს, რომელიც თავისებურ, პოსტსაბჭოთა პიბრილად გადაიქცა. იგი ხასიათდებოდა სათავეში მყოფი ვაგლენიანი პიროვნებებით, კორუფციულ ქსელში ჩართული ადამიანებითა და ნახევრად პრივატიზებული სახელმწიფოებრივი სტრუქტურით. როცა კორუფციას, ეკონომიკურ დაკნინებასა და არაეფექტურ სახელმწიფო სტრუქტურას ფანტაზიისა (დემოკრატია) და რეალობის (პოპულარული არაძალადობრიობა) ორი ბუნება შეერწყა, მივიღეთ არსებითი ხასიათის მოწყვლადობა ამ ტიპის რეჟიმების მიმართ, რაც ქართველმა პოლიტიკოსებმა კარგად აითვისეს. თუმცა, ამ პიონერულ შტრისზე გაცილებით მნიშვნელოვანია ის, რომ ვარდების რევოლუცია უსისხლოდ დასრულდა - ეს მოხდა ქვეყანაში, რომელმაც 15 წლის წინ გადაიტანა სამოქალაქო ომი, ორი ომი ტერიტორიული მთლიანობისათვის და პრეზიდენტის მკვლელობის, სულ მცირე, ორი მცდელობა. ამ მშვიდობიანმა რევოლუციამ მოლოდინი

გაუცრუა ბევრ ადამიანს, რომლებიც, სხვა საპროტესტო აქციების (1956, 1989, 1992 - პრეზიდენტ გამსახურდიას ჩამოგდება) მსგავსად, მის სისხლიან დასასრულს ელოდნენ.

საკითხავია, რადგან არავინ დაღუპულა ბარიკადებზე, მშვიდობიანი ცვლილების ინოვაციური მოდელი იყო ეს თუ, უბრალოდ, იღბალი?! ხომ არ იყო ეს რეგიონალური მოდელი რევოლუციისა, რომელსაც პოსტსაბჭოური მემკვიდრეობა აქვს და მობილიზაციის სტრატეგიებს იზიარებს (სერბული ახალგაზრდული ორგანიზაციის “otporis” აქტივისტმა, სლობოდან ჯინოვიჩმა განაცხადა, რომ შევარდნაძე მოიშორეს იუგოსლავური სცენარით), თუ მშვიდობიანი გამოსავალი, რომელსაც ქართული პოლიტიკური კონტექსტი ჰქონდა?

დაბოლოს, დასავლეთი და მისი მხარდაჭერა, სამოქალაქო-საზოგადოებრივი ინსტიტუტები, დემოკრატიის მაშენებელი პროგრამებით, რა დოზით ჩაერივნენ ამ უსისხლო გამარჯვებაში?!

## STEPHEN JONES

### GEORGIA'S ROSE REVOLUTION OF 2003: A FORCEFUL PEACE<sup>1</sup>

#### I. Introduction

Watching the theatre, heroism, and glory of the Rose Revolution in the cold and rainy streets of Tbilisi in November 2003, Georgian parents trembled with fear. Newspapers announced that trains transporting soldiers from the north to the capital of Tbilisi were blocked by villagers dragging logs onto the tracks. The State Chancellery warned of a 'second civil war.'<sup>2</sup> Georgian parents recalled similar challenges to the state in 1956, 1989, and 1991 which led to bloody climaxes and dead teenagers. Western leaders were also concerned. Earlier in 2003, Senator John McCain, John Shalikashvili (former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), and Strobe Talbott visited Georgia. In July James Baker flew in to Tbilisi to mediate honest elections. Lynn Pascoe, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs arrived on 18 November, a few days before the final confrontation. Why such attention? Georgia was a vital ally in the 'cold peace' being fought with Russia over energy pipelines and a violent breakdown would have unpredictable consequences for US marines stationed in Georgia. It would end the hope of a successful pro-Western transition in the region and reinforce the arguments of the US's domestic critics of wasteful spending on democratic experiments. Fortunately, the crisis in Georgia turned out to be non-violent. The climactic storming of the Georgian parliament ended with one smashed window and yet another political patriarch slinking off the political stage.

Many Western observers saw the Rose Revolution as a vindication of US and European policies of civic and democracy development. Richard Miles, the US ambassador at the time, sighed with relief that 'finally in Georgia there was something you could look at and say, 'it worked.'<sup>3</sup> But despite the triumphal rhetoric blasted through megaphones in Tbilisi's Freedom Square, and the rationalizations in Western capitals, this revolution like most others, hung on a thread, had no script, was unexpected and mostly unwanted by the opposition leaders themselves. The sober revolutionary, Leon Trotsky, reminds us that 'people do not make revolutions eagerly any more than they do war.' This was not a carnival despite rock groups and parades, and it could have ended in catastrophe.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> I would like to thank Gia Tarkhan-Mouravi, Lado Papava, Tedo Japaridze, Mamuka Tsereteli, and Zurab Karumidze for their comments on a draft of this chapter.

<sup>2</sup> *The Daily Telegraph*, 12 November, 2003, [www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2003/11/12/wgeor12.xml](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2003/11/12/wgeor12.xml).

<sup>3</sup> David Anable, 'The Role of Georgia's Media – and Western Aid – in Georgia's Rose Revolution' *Working Paper Series*, Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics, and Public Policy, no. 2006-3, 28.

<sup>4</sup> Leon Trotsky cited in 'The Russian Revolution: Red October and the Bolshevik Coup (2)' in *The History Guide: Lectures on Twentieth Century Europe*, [www.historyguide.org/europe/lecture6.html](http://www.historyguide.org/europe/lecture6.html) (last accessed 1/25/07).

The Rose Revolution, along with its 'coloured' companions in Serbia (2000), Ukraine (2004-2005) and Kyrgyzstan (2005) has added to the scholarly debate on revolution as well as to the successful record of non-violence against corrupt, often repressive, governments. It showed that speculation about the end of revolution after communist defeat and the triumph of 'liberal democracy' was premature.<sup>5</sup> Second, it proved the effectiveness of non-violent strategies. Political violence would have been the Rose Revolution's undoing. Third, despite the values it shared with the 1989 revolutions, the Rose Revolution made no demands for major economic, social or systemic change. It revealed a new model of post-communist revolution. The slogan of the Rose Revolution's leadership was 'revolution without revolution.' There was no ideological innovation, no 'anti-politics' or 'living in truth,' no social or peace movement, and no expectation of socio-economic transformation. Non-violence was a strategy, not an ideological goal. In terms of ideas, the revolution was poorer than its East European predecessors. Based on its ideological content, 'colourless' is the best adjective. It sought to improve market democracy and return to liberalism's constitutional principles. It was, as Ghia Nodia put it, a 'catch-up revolution' which wanted to join the mainstream, not abandon it.<sup>6</sup>

Yet the scale of protest, the rapidity of change, the disintegration of ruling elites, the abandonment of President Shevardnadze by the armed forces, the passionate speeches in front of the State Chancellery and the call for renewal and national unity – characterized a revolutionary situation. The Rose Revolution was a classic example of structural disintegration from the center, a process Sir Lewis Namier described as the 'corrosion of the moral and mental bases of government.'<sup>7</sup> But despite the important generational change in leadership, the 'emancipation' from corrupt elections and oligarchs, and claims for the Rose Revolution's global significance, in goals and outcome the Rose Revolution was an anti-revolutionary revolution.<sup>8</sup> It rejected absolutism and millenarianism in favor of normalcy and legality. The victors moved rapidly to have the November election results dismissed by the Supreme Court and new legal elections take place. This revolution was about moral regeneration, clean government, joining the world, and sticking to the rules, not about creative destruction or the building of a new society. Yet the non-violent struggle was passionate. It resulted in the complete and sudden removal of the old political elites.

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<sup>5</sup> See in particular the debate between Jeff Goodwin, 'Is the Age of Revolutions Over?,' and Eric Selbin, 'Same as It Ever Was: the Future of Revolution at the End of the Century', in Mark N. Katz (ed.) *Revolution: International Dimensions* (Washington D.C.: CQ Press), 272-297.

<sup>6</sup> Ghia Nodia, comments on my paper as discussant at the Conference on Civil Resistance and Power Politics, St Antony's College, University of Oxford, 15-18 March 2007.

<sup>7</sup> Cited from Sir Lewis Namier, *Vanished Supremacies*, (London, 1962) in Krishan Kumar (ed.) *Revolution: Readings in Politics and Society* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1971), 170-173.

<sup>8</sup> For an assessment of the relationship of the 1989 revolutions to revolutionary theory, see Richard Sakwa, 'The Age of Paradox: the Anti-Revolutionary Revolutions of 1989-1991,' in Moira Donald and Tim Rees (eds.) *Reinterpreting Revolution in Twentieth Century Europe* (New York: St Martin's Press, 2001), 159-176.

The fame of the Rose Revolution rests in part on its primacy. It was the first successful assault in the former Soviet Union on what the scholarly field calls 'competitive authoritarian states.' All such states – Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan - were (and most still are) led by Soviet-trained former *apparatchiki*. They were publicly committed to democracy including elections, a degree of press freedom and organized public dissent.<sup>9</sup> But all presided over regimes which had metamorphosed into peculiar post-Soviet capitalist hybrids, distinguished by presidential strongmen ruling through corrupt client networks and semi-privatized state structures over fractured societies. The duality of fantasy ('democracy') and reality (popular powerlessness), when combined with corruption, economic decline, and ineffectual state structures, produced significant vulnerabilities in these regimes which Georgian dissenters were the first successfully to exploit.

More important than its pioneering feature (which only applied to the post-Soviet space) was the Rose Revolution's bloodless consummation - this in a country which over the last fifteen years has experienced a civil war, two secessionist wars and at least two assassination attempts on its President. How was it that this peaceful liberal revolution – what Timothy Garton Ash in another context has called 'refolution' - confounded the expectations of many of us who concluded it could only end in bloodshed like the Georgian protests of 1956 and 1989, and 1992 (the overthrow of President Gamsakhurdia). Was it an innovative model of peaceful change or blind luck that no one was sacrificed on the barricades? Was it a regional model of revolution based on post-Soviet legacies and shared mobilization strategies – the Serbian youth organization *Otpor*'s Slobodan Djindjic declared that Shevardnadze was ousted 'according to the Yugoslav scenario'<sup>10</sup> - or was the peaceful outcome due to Georgia's own political context? And finally, to what degree did the West and its support of civil society institutions and democracy-building programs, contribute to the bloodless victory?

## II. The Context: the Post-Soviet Legacy in Georgia

After the overthrow of President Gamsakhurdia in January 1992, Western governments saw Shevardnadze as the best political bet for the transition to liberal democratic state building in Georgia. But despite restoring central government and stabilizing the economy between 1992 and 1995, Shevardnadze's government failed to establish its authority or democratic credentials. It was constructed from the roof downwards and although democratic scaffolding was in place, its core was a tradition-based patrimonial authority which ruled by custom, threat, private dispensations and

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<sup>9</sup> Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, 'Elections Without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism,' *Journal of Democracy*, 13, no.2, (2002) 51-65.

<sup>10</sup> *The Hindu*, 31 Dec. 2003, [www.hindu.com/2003/12/31/stories/2003123101161000.htm](http://www.hindu.com/2003/12/31/stories/2003123101161000.htm).

privileges granted by the President. The state facilitated private networks that dominated the country's economic life and which deprived it of the proper political and economic revenues needed to function. The state was effectively privatized, in part by Shevardnadze's family. It had no monopoly of violence in vast areas of the country which were either independent or ruled by regional overseers accountable to a chief executive who after 30 years of almost uninterrupted leadership, had slipped into routine and passivity. Shevardnadze relied on familiar personnel, traditional networks, and *ad hoc* advisory bodies such as the National Security Council and the regionally appointed governors to maintain his power, rather than accountable institutions and popular authority. The council of ministers was a rag-bag of officials with no collective identity or political influence and parliament's power was undermined by ineffective parties, fixed elections and powerful unelected regional governors. Clientalism and informal channels of power were the hallmark of Georgian politics under Gamsakhurdia and Shevardnadze.<sup>11</sup>

Lucan Way argues that a major feature of this soft authoritarianism is 'the inability of incumbents to maintain power or concentrate political control by preserving elite unity, controlling elections and media, and/or using force against opponents.' The source of this 'pluralism by default' as he calls it, is 'incumbent weakness,' 'ineffective elite organization,' and 'a widely popular national identity' which together undermine the incumbent's political capacity even where civil society is weak.<sup>12</sup> Georgia under Shevardnadze was not in the same authoritarian category as Russia and Belarus, but the fragmentation of the state, deepened by centrifugal forces among Georgia's national minorities and competition among criminalized elite networks within the ministries and security bodies, led to a dilemma for Shevardnadze. How to remain a 'democrat' without democracy? Splitting power at the top and permitting dissent from below gave an impression of pluralism and competition, but it disguised the fact that Shevardnadze, though not quite a dictator, was not much of a democrat either. When the crisis came, he was unable to unite political elites to defend his 'democracy' or to appeal to popular sentiment against rebellious former ministers. Poor constitutional design, which worked against collective responsibility in the cabinet, and poor supervision of parliament and the executive added to his troubles. When the time came to defend the regime, the long-standing competition and antagonism among Georgia's post-Soviet elites made a coherent government response impossible. Most important of all was Shevardnadze's status as a lame duck President. With 17 months left of his term, there was little point in defending him. The lame duck, in the days and weeks of November, became a visibly dead duck. This is what primarily separates 2003 from the violent experiences of 1956, 1989 and 1990-91

<sup>11</sup> For an assessment of the Shevardnadze era, see Jonathan Wheatley's *Georgia from National Awakening to Rose Revolution: Delayed Transition in the Former Soviet Union* (Aldershot: Ashgate), 2005.

<sup>12</sup> Lucan Way, 'Authoritarian State Building and the Sources of Regime Competitiveness in the Fourth Wave: The Cases of Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine,' *World Politics*, 57, no.2 (2005) 231-261.

when the state had the ability – and took the initiative – to suppress the opposition violently. In November 2003, by contrast, Shevardnadze had been abandoned by all.

The fragility of the *ancien regime* is only part of the story. Revolutions are complicated, often inarticulate sequences of events that are shaped by ideological frameworks, leadership errors, popular participation and, in many cases, external involvement. In the Georgian case, the catalyst for years of popular discontent was the 2 November parliamentary elections. Since 1990 Georgians have participated in thirteen nationwide elections but before 2003, only two (in October 1990 and arguably October 1992), led to any real change in power. Georgian elections since 1992 have been peaceful, but marred by party boycotts, poor electoral design, including vast disparities between the numbers of voters in each electoral district, inadequate mechanisms for ensuring transparency, and a party list system which marginalized national minority representation. The falsified election in Georgia in November, as in Serbia and Ukraine, was a perfect tool for the Georgian opposition to underline the illegitimacy of the regime, maintain popular attention, mobilize citizens, and invite international attention.<sup>13</sup>

In the lead up to the November 2003 parliamentary elections, there was hope that new legislation incorporated into the Unified Election Code, would end government manipulation of the vote. There was for the first time a real choice of parties beyond those compromised by deals and alliances with the government. Amendments provided for parallel tabulation of votes, a new marking system to prevent repeat voting, the eradication of supplementary voting lists, and the open tabulation of precinct election results. Electoral Commissions, which had been in the hands of the ruling parties, were revamped to give the opposition better representation. But despite \$2.4 million from the US government to help Georgia prepare for the November ballot and the presence of 5,000 electoral observers from the OSCE, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI), and indigenous NGOs – and regardless of exit polls pointing to quite different results – Shevardnadze's unpopular coalition 'For a New Georgia,' secured first place in the 235 seat house with 21.3% of the vote (57 MPs). The Union of Democratic Revival, led by Aslan Abashidze, came second with 18.8% (39 MPs). Abashidze ruled Achara, an autonomous republic in Georgia's south west, as a personal fiefdom, and free elections had not taken place there for over a decade. In the November 2003 election, his party won 96.7% of the vote in Achara, with a Soviet-style 97% turnout. The United National Movement, led by the youthful and popular Mikheil (Misha)

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<sup>13</sup> For a review of Georgian elections between 1992-1995, Darell Slider 'Democratization in Georgia' in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (eds.) *Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus* (Cambridge, UK: CUP, 1997), 156-198. For the 2003-2004 elections, see Stephen Jones 'Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Georgia, 2004' *Electoral Studies*, 24, no. 2, June 2005, 303-311; on the November 2003 parliamentary elections, see *Georgia, What Now?* (Tbilisi/Brussels: International Crisis Group), Europe Report no. 151. [www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/caucasus/151\\_georgia\\_what\\_now.pdf](http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/caucasus/151_georgia_what_now.pdf) (last accessed 7/25/07)



Saakashvili, came in third with 18.1% (36 MPs) despite leading in the exit polls and in the parallel tabulation of votes.<sup>14</sup>

Given expectations of change and the crude falsification of the vote, the November result led to mass indignation. The opposition, in particular strategists in the Liberty Institute, knew the methods and techniques that had made 'electoral revolutions' in the Philippines (1986), Chile (1988), Slovakia (1998), and Serbia (2000) so powerful, and over the month of November, using a combination of patriotic rallies, marches, boycott of parliament, painted slogans, T-shirts blazoned with anti-Shevardnadze catchphrases, and concerts, focused on maintaining high numbers of demonstrators on Rustaveli Prospect, the main thoroughfare, effectively paralyzing the government. The planning, discipline and organizational capacity of the opposition (helped by cell phones and the internet) was a crucial departure from previous revolts in Georgia since independence, but it was the bitter popular disappointment with a regime that had failed to end the population's economic misery that led them to the streets.

### III. An Innovative Model of Change?

On 10 November, in televised comments, Shevardnadze declared he was 'elected by the Georgian people, and I do not intend to resign at the demand of individual politicians and a few dozen young people waving flags.'<sup>15</sup> He thought, as he later confirmed, that it would all blow over. But this time was different. First, the opposition was organized with an artful thirty-six year old Mikheil Saakashvili at its head, backed by a supreme strategist, the former Speaker of parliament and Shevardnadze's erstwhile campaign manager, Zurab Zhvania. Before 2003, like other governments in the CIS, the Georgian administration had faced little organized political resistance in parliament. Georgian political parties, despite their colourful posturing and occasional successes, were not formed by grass roots organizations but were creations of the state or powerful kingpins. They belonged to what Scott Mainwaring calls 'weakly institutionalized' party systems - volatile, poorly rooted, weak in legitimacy, and possessing few resources with indistinguishable programs.<sup>16</sup> The formation of the United National Movement in October 2001 by Saakashvili changed the political landscape. Saakashvili, an effective populist, exalted 'the people' and displayed unabashed patriotism. He resembled the best media-savvy American politicians and after his resignation as Justice Minister in the fall of 2001, as newly

<sup>14</sup> Some of this material, including statistics on the elections results in November 2003 is in my 'Presidential and Parliamentary Elections'. See also Jean-Christophe Peuch, 'Georgia's Parliamentary Elections: Democracy in the Making,' *Caucasus Election Watch*, (Washington D.C: Center for Strategic and International Studies), 27 Oct., 2003; for more detail, see *International Election Observation Mission; Parliamentary Elections, Georgia - 2nd November 2003* (Tbilisi: OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission), 2003, 9. [www.osce.org/press\\_rel/2003/pdf\\_documents/11-3659-odihr1.pdf](http://www.osce.org/press_rel/2003/pdf_documents/11-3659-odihr1.pdf) (last accessed 1/25/07).

<sup>15</sup> *The Guardian*, 10 Nov. 2003, [www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,,1081370,00.html](http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,,1081370,00.html).

<sup>16</sup> Scott Mainwaring, 'Party System in the Third Wave,' in Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner (eds.) *The Global Divergence of Democracies* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 185-199.

ected Chair of the Tbilisi City Council, he relentlessly exposed government corruption. His party, though dependent on Saakashvili's personality, was more modern and more successful than any other in reaching out to the regions, to disillusioned students and to marginalized pensioners. It was the first really post-Soviet party, one that Shevardnadze was unable to tempt with sinecures and access to state resources. It was led by sophisticated urban youth, many of whom had been educated in the West, had worked in Western NGOs in Georgia, or had participated in Western-funded indigenous NGOs like the Liberty Institute, which promoted media freedom, religious tolerance and human rights.

Second, the united opposition had a strategy. Benefiting from networks of European civil society activists and electronic access to international media, the National Movement, the United Democrats and other smaller allied parties quickly absorbed the lessons of non-violent movements elsewhere. The influence of the Serbian opposition including the youth movement, *Otpor* (Resistance), which had helped oust Slobodan Milosevic in October 2000, was important. Giga Bokeria, the National Movement's most influential ideologue, along with Levan Ramishvili, a founder of the influential Liberty Institute, met with *Otpor* and other Serbian activists in Belgrade in spring 2003. In the summer of 2003, *Otpor* trainers traveled to Tbilisi to instruct Georgian youth. The Georgian youth organization *kmara* (Enough), established in the spring of 2003 and a noisy battalion in the Rose Revolution, replicated the tactics of *Otpor*.<sup>17</sup> Its organizational model, like *Otpor*'s, was horizontal and decentralized. Its confrontational tactics included the establishment of youth groups, outreach to traditionally apolitical sections of the population through graffiti, rallies, and theatre, including the cooption of rock groups and media personalities. In mid-November, as *kmara* activists mobilized demonstrators by email and cell phone in the Liberty Institute - its walls decorated with Serbian resistance posters including the clenched fist of *Otpor* - the independent TV channel, Rustavi 2, showed the film 'Bringing down a Dictator,' a documentary about the fall of Milosevic.<sup>18</sup> Ivane Merabishvili, general secretary of the United National Movement and by all accounts the organizational genius of the Rose Revolution, later declared that 'all the demonstrators knew the tactics of the revolution in Belgrade by heart because they showed . . . the film on their revolution. Everyone knew what to do. This was a copy of that revolution, only louder.'<sup>19</sup>

The ideas of the National Movement, as it became known, were not Gandhian. There was no clear code of conduct defining passive resistance, no condemnation of force. The fiery symbol of the revolution, Mikheil Saakashvili, was irascible and emotional, threatening revenge and retribution. But the lessons of the Serbian experience were clear: renounce armed struggle which had proved too costly in Georgia in the early 1990s; mobilize crowds onto the streets to prevent retaliation; ensure international media coverage; fraternize with the police and army; maintain a

<sup>17</sup> On the role of *kmara* in the Rose Revolution, Giorgi Kandelaki 'Georgia's Rose Revolution: A Participant's Perspective' United States Institute of Peace, *Special Report* 167, July 2006.

<sup>18</sup> David Anable, 'The Role of Georgia's Media,' 5.

<sup>19</sup> Anable, *Ibid.*, 11

unified political opposition and establish an alternative source of authority. Nino Burjanadze, Speaker of the Parliament, for example, was persuaded to announce herself interim Georgian President the day before Shevardnadze's resignation. The decision to create a Civil Disobedience Committee, also known as 'Art Committee' (*Artcom* for short) because of the large number of artists, film directors and writers in its leadership, was an echo of the Serbian campaign. Its strategy of disruption included sit-down demonstrations at regional administrative offices, occupations of universities, chains of people around the State Chancellery, strikes (some teachers responded), and synchronous horn blowing by Tbilisi's cars, a sound which eerily echoed the whistle blowing of striking factories in 1917.<sup>20</sup>

The effect of the Serbian movement should not be exaggerated; its impact in Georgia depended on the right local conditions, among them weak incumbency, an electoral crisis, and a united opposition – but it illustrates the importance of two phenomena in the Rose Revolution: first, what Marc Beissinger calls 'modular action,' or revolutionary waves as one revolutionary opposition emulates another.<sup>21</sup> Our electronic world permits rapid communication between what Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink call 'transnational advocacy networks.'<sup>22</sup> These international networks consist of democracy activists who have access to significant funding from international foundations and Western governments. The Liberty Institute, *kmara*, the Georgian Young Lawyers Association (GYLA), and other NGOs – important influences on the course of the Rose Revolution – benefited from information, training and advice from these international alliances. Second, the ideas of these advocacy networks reflect not only democratization and a moralization of politics, but a renewed practice of non-violence and grass roots mobilization. Leaving aside for now whether this establishes a new 'soft power' of Western hegemony, it has led to the creation of a network of 'professional revolutionaries' (or 'consultants' if they get paid), supported by Western states, transnational organizations and international NGOs.<sup>23</sup> Their activity stretches as far as Lebanon and Zimbabwe. The ideas, methods and success of the Rose Revolutionaries, who participated in these networks from the 1990s on, showed them to be adept learners.

#### IV. A New Georgian Path

Mark Beissinger suggests that without the Serbian 'Bulldozer' revolution, there would likely have been no Rose Revolution at all.<sup>24</sup> His proposition underlines the

<sup>20</sup> Interview with David Zurabishvili, one of the leaders of the Liberty Institute, in Zurab Karumidze and James V. Wertsch (eds.) *"Enough: The Rose Revolution in the Republic of Georgia, 2003"* (New York: Nova Science Publishers Inc., 2005), 66.

<sup>21</sup> Mark Beissinger, Dept. of Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 'Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: the Diffusion of Bulldozer/Orange/Tulip Revolutions,' paper to be published in *Perspectives on Politics*, June 2007.

<sup>22</sup> See Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).

<sup>23</sup> Nicolas Guilhot in his *The Democracy Makers: Human Rights and the Politics of Global Order* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2005), suggests that these advocacy networks have become a new instrument of Western powers and their strategic and economic goals in developing countries.

<sup>24</sup> Beissinger, 'Structure and Example,' 25

impact of ideas, emulation, and international advocacy networks over structure, culture, and history as sources of Georgia's Rose Revolution. Other analyses of post-communist stagnation and weak statehood emphasize the legacies of the Soviet era and national political culture. Jadwiga Staniszkis, Ken Jowitt, and Katherine Verdery are some of the best known scholars who have thought about the complexities of path dependence in communist and post-communist states.<sup>25</sup> Their ideas suggest the best clues to the genesis of the coloured revolutions is in national-Soviet legacies.

In answering why the Shevardnadze regime was defeated and why it went peacefully, structural explanations, focusing on the weakness of the ancien regime, are convincing. But they cannot be disconnected from national legacies and political culture.<sup>26</sup> There are four specific Georgian contexts to the Rose Revolution I want to highlight. First, twentieth century Georgian history is littered with bloody revolutions and counter-revolutions (or attempted revolutions and coups, depending on your definition): 1905, February 1917, February 1921 (the Red Army invasion of Georgia), the end of Communist rule in 1989-1990 and the overthrow of President Gamsakhurdia in 1992. The non-violent Rose Revolution in this historical context is exceptional, yet its peaceful outcome was, in part, conditioned by the country's history of violence. Zurab Zhvania, in an interview on the November 2003 events, declared:

People were not looking for a revolution . . . The new generation in Georgia has experienced what civil unrest means [in the civil war and war in Abkhazia in the early 1990s]. They have experienced how turbulent events can affect every family.<sup>27</sup>

The Georgian population was severely chastened by the civil war of 1991-3, which ended in the destruction of Tbilisi's city center, the division of families, and 100s of dead and wounded. The bloody failure of Gamsakhurdia's radical revolution in 1991-93 contributed to a popular mood which rejected violence and excessive militancy. In an IRI survey in May 2003, six months before the Rose Revolution brought thousands onto the streets, 75% disapproved of 'demonstrations without permission' and 78% condemned the 'occupation of buildings and enterprises.'<sup>28</sup> This mood was reinforced by the position of the Georgian Church. Consistently the most respected institution among Georgians in opinion polls, it warned against violence in its sermons, in the patriarch's epistles, and at decisive moments on Georgians' path to independence, such as the Patriarch's call to abandon public protest in April 1989 just before demonstrators were slaughtered by Soviet troops. The Shevardnadze

<sup>25</sup> See Jadwiga Staniszkis, *The Ontology of Socialism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), Ken Jowitt, *The New World Disorder: the Leninist Extinction* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), and Katherine Verdery, *What was Socialism, and What Comes Next?* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998).

<sup>26</sup> Classic examples of structural interpretations of revolution, which because of their emphasis on peasant societies, have less relevance to the Georgia case, are Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative analysis of France, Russia, and China* (Cambridge, UK, CUP, 1979), Barrington Moore Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), Jack Goldstone, *Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).

<sup>27</sup> Karumidze and Wertsch, "Enough," 35.

<sup>28</sup> International Republican Institute/Georgia [www.iri.org/eurasia/georgia.asp](http://www.iri.org/eurasia/georgia.asp) (last accessed 20th August, 2007), 'Survey of Georgian Public Opinion' May 2003, 15.

government exploited this anxiety and warned of the dangers of 'one more civil confrontation.'<sup>29</sup> In this context, any attempt to use arms would have damned the National Movement and have made victory less likely, less legitimate, and less popular.

Second, although the Serbs provided a systematic strategy for civic resistance, non-violent strategies were not new to Georgians. In the last decades of Soviet rule in Georgia, rallies, petitions, hunger strikes and appeals to international forums took place. Some, like the 1978 protest in central Tbilisi demanding the retention of Georgian language status in the constitution, were successful demonstrations of public resistance. At the same time, the bloody denouements to public rallies in 1956 and 1989, added to the heroic virtues of defiance. After the collapse of the USSR, Georgian politics was an intoxicating mix of civic protests, boycotts, occupations, sit-ins, mass rallies and vigils. Although they were overshadowed in the Western media by reports of violence, parliamentary fistfights and attacks on religious minorities, these civic strategies were successful weapons against state arbitrariness. They brought Gamsakhurdia's government to power, and they helped bring it down. In November 2000, non-violent rallies led to the resignation of the government and in October 2001, to the resignation of a number of powerful ministers. There was a strong and fruitful tradition of direct action and civic resistance to draw upon in Georgia. The Serbian model incorporated civic protests into an overall strategy, but Georgian activists were experienced organizers.

Third, the Rose Revolution was a revolution of national and moral regeneration. Its complaints focused on Georgian domestic troubles such as state and judicial corruption, unemployment, disreputable political parties, and healthcare. But underlying this concern for practical improvements in their lives, was a yearning among Georgians for a lost identity, pride and national renewal. Saakashvili in a later interview declared the Rose Revolution 'was all about morality and restoring morality in the government.'<sup>30</sup> The absence of the Georgian Patriarch at the opening of the new - and to most people illegitimate - parliament on 22 November under Shevardnadze's jurisdiction, was an endorsement of the opposition's claims for the moral high ground. Just as Gandhi's spinning wheel symbolized a return to an idealized past of community and simplicity, the new Georgian flag of five crosses which fluttered in thousands at every rally, represented a return to a lost past of Christian morality and a repossession of Georgia's 'special place within European civilization.'<sup>31</sup> Georgians' enthusiasm for integration into Europe, their ardent support of Western interests from the NATO to US troops in Georgia, the participation of Georgian youth in Western educational exchange programs (Saakashvili was educated at Columbia University), all contributed to dense connections with European (and North American) governments, NGOs, and international financial organizations in the 1990s. Much more than in neighboring Azerbaijan and Armenia, this contributed to a small, but exceptionally sophisticated

<sup>29</sup> Nodar Ladaria in "Enough," 116.

<sup>30</sup> Mikheil Saakashvili in "Enough," 26.

<sup>31</sup> See Mikheil Saakashvili's inaugural speech as newly elected President in Jan. 2004. 'Inaugural speech by President Mikheil Saakashvili' [www.president.gov.ge/?l=E&m=1&sm=1](http://www.president.gov.ge/?l=E&m=1&sm=1), last accessed 1/26/07.

Third Sector which as the Shevardnadze era dragged on became increasingly politicized and oppositionist.

Finally, there is Eduard Shevardnadze. The personality of leaders can make or break revolutions. Shevardnadze was shaped by his long experience with public resistance in the USSR and post-Soviet Georgia. He learned, before the debacle of Gamsakhurdian excess, that government violence in Georgia, even in tough situations, rarely gains support. It is a sure way to undermine government legitimacy. This understanding, combined with his helplessness as power ebbed away from his office, and an awareness that bloody denouements result in retribution, led in the end to the inevitable decision to resign without a fight despite a final feeble attempt to declare a state of emergency.

## V. Civil Society and the West

One of the more popular theories used to explain the peaceful outcome of the Rose Revolution is the growth of Georgian civil society. Laurence Broers suggests that 'it was civil society, rather than warlord armies, that emerged as the major force behind the revolution.'<sup>32</sup> Valerie Bunce in her work on comparative youth and electoral revolutions agrees that post-communist revolutions were 'built on the long-term development and organizational capabilities of civil society.'<sup>33</sup> David Anable points to the media, an important instrument of civil society, as the crucial factor.<sup>34</sup> Underlying all these arguments is the implication that Western governments and organizations, by funding democracy-building programs and the media, played a crucial role in preparing the conditions for a peaceful Rose Revolution.

The impact of the West on Georgian civil society development was powerful. Between 1995 and 2000, the US government spent over \$700 million on direct aid to Georgia. The US blanketed Georgia with civic and democracy-building programs through USAID, NDI, the World Bank, the Eurasia Foundation and a myriad of other smaller programs. The EU was not far behind. Between 1991 and 2003, it contributed total grant aid valued at more than €385 million and this did not include contributions from separate member states.<sup>35</sup> Shevardnadze's tolerance of the process - an acknowledgement of his pro-Western orientation and support of his claims for Western credits - led to the largest Third Sector in the Caucasus. In 2005, 9000 NGOs were registered with the Ministry of Justice, although not all were active. Shevardnadze later regretted his indulgence - he threatened at one stage to expel the Soros Foundation from Georgia - for he realized, as Thomas Carothers, Michael McFaul, and others

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<sup>32</sup> Laurence Broers, 'After The Revolution: Civil Society and the Challenges of Consolidating Democracy in Georgia,' (unpublished paper), 2.

<sup>33</sup> Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik, 'Youth and Electoral Revolution in Slovakia, Serbia, and Georgia,' *SALS Review*, XXVI, no. 2, (Summer-Fall 2006), 55-65.

<sup>34</sup> David Anable, 'The Role of Georgia's Media,' *passim*.

<sup>35</sup> *Country Strategy Paper 2003-2006, TACIS National Indicative Program 2004-2006, Georgia* (Brussels: European Commission, 2003), 5. [ec.europa.eu/comm/external\\_relations/georgia/csp/georgia\\_csp\\_6.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/georgia/csp/georgia_csp_6.pdf), (last accessed 7/25/07).

have pointed out, that it is precisely such political space that gives the opposition its opportunity.<sup>36</sup> Despite the waste, inefficacy, poor coordination and one-sided understanding of civil society among Western funders - trade unions as defenders of labor rights were completely neglected, for example -- a Westernized, educated, and youthful 'labor aristocracy' was nurtured and sustained. The privileged leaders of the Georgian Third Sector in Tbilisi, paid in dollars and driving imposing looking Landrovers, were often resented by the general population, but they promoted norms of democracy and civil rights in legislation, in the media, and in the universities.

The Georgian Third Sector was elitist and weak; it had poor representation in the provinces, was dependent on Western funding, and its penetration of Georgian society was shallow. Yet it had a disproportionate influence on the Rose Revolution and its peaceful outcome. First, Georgian NGOs, loosely coordinated by Western-funded organizations such as the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED) and GYLA, mobilized thousands of monitors and established a system of parallel voting tabulation and exit polls in a number of precincts. Forty-three monitoring organizations were registered with the Central Election Commission and ISFED alone claimed it dispensed 2500 monitors.<sup>37</sup> This exercise proved that a cynical electoral swindle had nullified the popular will. Whether the parallel voting tabulations and the exit polls were accurate did not matter. The popular perception was that they were, because they differed from government tallies. Second, NGOs had the equipment and training to mobilize the population and coordinate demonstrations throughout November. Saakashvili in his own assessment of the Rose Revolution admitted 'the mobile phone was very important.'<sup>38</sup> Third - and more important than the cell phone - was the NGO movement's close association with the media and its ability to generate interest in the West. The Liberty Institute, which took a leading role in November 2003 and helped establish *kmara*, was created in the mid-1990s by two employees (Levan Ramishvili and Giga Bokeria) of Rustavi-2, an independent TV channel highly critical of the government. During November, Rustavi 2 was the most important tool for mobilizing the public - Ghia Nodia called it the 'revolution television.'<sup>39</sup> Rustavi 2 later dubbed itself the 'TV of the Victorious People.'

Western governments and their money played a vital role in keeping the Third Sector alive in the 1990s. The media assistance programs from the Eurasia Foundation, USAID and the Californian NGO, Internews, were critical in the early stages of Georgia's media development. In the lead up to the November elections, the international community created an Ambassadorial Working Group (AWG) and a Technical Working Group (TWG) to help ensure proper elections. IREX, a US agency concerned primarily with exchange programs, helped organize political debates for regional and Tbilisi-based media. Western money helped transform the November

<sup>36</sup> Thomas Carothers, *Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion* (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004), especially 167-217. Michael McFaul, 'Transitions from Communism,' *Journal of Democracy*, 16, no. 3, July 2005, 5-19.

<sup>37</sup> *International Election Observation Mission: Parliamentary Elections, Georgia -- 2<sup>nd</sup> November 2003*, 9.

<sup>38</sup> Mikheil Saakashvili in "Enough," 25.

<sup>39</sup> Cited in David Anable, 'The Role of Georgia's Media,' 9

election into an open and technically sophisticated referendum on Shevardnadze's record. Western governments' multiple linkages to Georgian society and business, and their crucial role in Georgian economic and military security, significantly hindered Shevardnadze's ability to use force. An important turning point in the November events was the US withdrawal of support for Shevardnadze's conduct of the elections. On 20 November, the US State Department declared that 'the results do not accurately reflect the will of the Georgian people, but... reflect massive vote fraud.'<sup>40</sup> Even so late in the game, Zurab Zhvania believes Shevardnadze could have recovered.

The Western contribution to the Rose Revolution was ambiguous. Western governments supported Shevardnadze for years when it was clear that reform and democratization had stalled. They discouraged - in particular US ambassador Richard Miles - the Rose revolutionaries from radical action, preferring negotiations and the preservation of the Shevardnadze regime until its term officially ended.<sup>41</sup> On this, they were one with the Russian government. At the same time, their democracy-building programs created a frustrated and educated constituency for change. In November, Western governments were confused. They wanted both stability and change. However, their pressure on Saakashvili and Shevardnadze to refrain from violence was an important calculation for both contenders. The first to use violence would tilt Western support in favor of his opponent.

External intervention can have a crucial impact on revolutions. But in this case, overall US support for Shevardnadze or Saakashvili had marginal influence. The same applies to Russia. Its government was as baffled as its Western counterparts. Russian foreign minister Igor Ivanov, dispatched to Georgia on 23 November, was, according to Zurab Zhvania, 'shocked' at the speed of events. After greeting protestors and briefly trying to affect some compromise, he departed for Achara.<sup>42</sup> This was a Georgian revolution made by Georgians in Georgian conditions. The man in charge was a Columbia-educated lawyer which strengthened the view of Shevardnadze and Russian officials that Western governments were behind the revolt, but they were not and gave no surety of influence either. Pol Pot, after all, was educated in Paris.

### **Conclusion: A bit of luck and a lot of pluck?**

Was the non-violent outcome luck? The answer - although it provides no new insight - is yes and no. All peaceful revolutions - that is, minimally, contesting groups backed by large-scale popular participation, compressed and unconstitutional political change, and elite replacement - are often a matter of 'luck and pluck.' But much depends on the authorities, the strategies of the opposition, the role of outsiders (what if Russia had provoked violence in Abkhazia?), and the local political culture

<sup>40</sup> 'Washington says Georgia election results reflect "massive vote fraud,"' 21 Nov. 2003, *Agence France Presse*.

<sup>41</sup> David Zurabishvili in "Enough," 65.

<sup>42</sup> Zurab Zhvania in "Enough," 38-39.



(attitudes towards guns, for example). In November there seemed to be a lot of luck; a shoot out in Samegrelo, West Georgia, during the election campaign, was quickly controlled; club-wielding Acharans stationed outside the parliament under the orders of Aslan Abashidze, never used them; the police never put up any serious resistance to the large crowds as they stormed parliament, and the army, despite Shevardnadze's last ditch attempt to introduce a state of emergency, stayed in its barracks.

But it was not *blind* luck. First, the bad luck that brings violence was fettered by Georgian conditions. This is what made 2003 a peaceful revolution compared to the bloody tragedies in 1956 and 1989. By mid-November, it was clear – unlike 1956 and 1989 – that the state had lost its governing capacity. Shevardnadze was powerless. He had alienated reformers, initiated the disintegration of his own party - the Citizens Union of Georgia - and had failed to create a coherent government. He had long lost the media which considered itself victimized by the government, and students (who in September 1993 had begged on their knees that he withdraw his resignation). He alienated many in the Georgian Church, both his Western and Russian allies, lost touch with vital regional constituencies, and most importantly of all, failed to secure the loyalty of an impoverished army and a corrupt police force. The police had not been paid for three months prior to November 2003.

Second, the opposition by mid-November was united - with some exceptions such as the Labor Party and the party of New Rightists - behind a charismatic leader who promoted a non-violent strategy. This included fraternization with the police (providing police guards with sandwiches and sending women to place flowers in their gun barrels), the paralysis of government by overwhelming numbers on the streets, clever stage-managed images of popular support for Western cameras, mobilization of the provinces, and finally a heroic storming of the last corrupt bastion of the ancien regime - the parliament - with roses in their hands. The role of Saakashvili was fundamental. Revolutions need their leaders and Saakashvili's commanding style – brash, risky, energetic, – was in line with Georgian cultural expectations. The mild mannered Zhvania and the neatly coiffured Nino Burjunadze, his colleagues in the triumvirate which emerged from the revolution, did not fit the bill.

The November events reflected Lenin's two conditions for revolution: '“lower classes” [who] do not want the old way, and ... “upper classes” [who] cannot carry on in the old way.’<sup>43</sup> Civil society, the media, Western governments and the opposition – all had a role in establishing propitious conditions for a peaceful transfer of power in November 2003. But all were secondary to the most significant agent of the non-violent revolution – a disarmed, illegitimate and morally compromised government unable to control its own armed forces. This, combined with a united, popular and

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<sup>43</sup> Krishan Kumar, *Revolution*, 165.

well-led opposition reduced bad luck's capacity to turn the revolution into a bloody one.

However, the practice of non-violence in November 2003 was a strategic decision. This explains, as does Georgia's unstable regional environment and the demands of state-building, why Georgia's Rose Revolutionaries have spent their energies since 2003 on the creation of a powerful army. Georgia in 2007, where the ideas of civil resistance along with the influence of civil society have been marginalized by a government-inspired martial patriotism, suggests the legacy of successful civil resistance on a state's administrative practice and foreign policy is a limited one. This was confirmed forcefully by the violent events in November 2007 when President Saakashvili, the Rose Revolution's fabled leader, crushed peaceful demonstrations against his government and declared a state of emergency. Peace and "normal politics" has since been restored, but the Rose Revolution's bloom has faded.